A brief history of terror in Iraq

The Islamic State (IS) seems to be a reality that one must reckon with by now. But how did it come to this? Peter Nealen of SOFREP.com gives us a brief overview of a history of terror that starts with al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia/Iraq (AQI) and leads to the Islamic State of today.

al-Qaeda in Iraq started in 2003, originally under the name Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad (Group for Monotheism and Holy War). Its founder was Abu Musab al Zarqawi, an aspiring jihadist who went to Afghanistan, which was already abandoned by the Soviets. After he could no longer participate in the jihad against the Soviets, he turned his attention to the overthrow in the Kingdom of Jordan, his home country, where he was imprisoned and was only released in 1999 as part of an amnesty. Zarqawi immediately returned to Afghanistan and trained with other Islamists in Herat, until he traveled to Iraq to join Ansar al Islam.

Michael Ledeen in his book The Iranian Time Bomb has shown Zarkawi's connections with both al-Qaeda and Iran as early as 2002. While Zarkawi's activities in Iraq have attracted considerable attention, there are lesser-known court proceedings indicating his activities and agents in Germany and Italy. The fact that Ansar al Islam, a group that felt affiliated with al-Qaeda, fled to Iran following the US invasion in 2003, suggests that the mullahs have supported al-Qaeda punctually - at least against the West.

In October 2004, Zarkawi openly pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda, at the same time changing the name of his group to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). A month later, US Marines stormed the Iraqi city of Fallujah to destroy the elements of AQI that had entrenched themselves in the city. However, the majority of the leadership managed to escape the attack.

AQI's tactic was less oriented towards classic guerrilla attacks, where light weapons or indirect fire would be opened on US and Iraqi forces, but rather on suicide bombings designed to cause maximum damage. Although AQI did attack US forces, it increasingly targeted Shiite Iraqis, a trend that even caused concern among the leadership of al-Qaeda.

In July 2005, Zarkawi sent a letter to Osama bin Laden's deputy Ayman al Zawahiri, describing his strategy for Iraq. He mentioned that they must strive to drive out US and coalition forces from the country and establish Sharia law. However, the bulk of the letter is a tirade against the Shiites and those Sunnis who are not willing to sacrifice themselves alongside Zarkawi's hardliners. (For example, he refers to the sheikhs as "Sufis" - these are seen as heretics by both Shiites and Sunnis - to make them contemptible for not supporting his bloody jihad.) Zarkawi recommends strikes against the Shiites as one of the most important steps "to draw the Muslim nation into battle."

In the following months, AQI increasingly claimed responsibility for major attacks and abductions. AQI was also suspected of being behind chlorine bomb attacks carried out in 2006-2007. Their activities increasingly aimed at killing as many Shiites as possible. Zarkawi's letter received a response from Ayman al Zawahiri, who urged him not to target Shiites, as the Islamic Ummah must unite against the infidels. Zarkawi ignored this message, leading to a break between the central al-Qaeda leadership and its Iraqi sub-branch, at least until Zarkawi's death in an airstrike in 2006.

In January of the same year, Zarkawi had founded the Mujahedin Shura Council as an umbrella organization for Sunni jihadists in Iraq. By then, Zarkawi's network was already the destination for most aspiring jihadists who came to the country. He also had the most extensive network of all organizations in the Iraqi "resistance." AQI later took responsibility for all actions under the name of the Mujahedin Shura Council until October, when Abu Ayyub al Masri declared the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). This became the new umbrella organization for several groups, and AQI now acknowledged its actions under the name ISI.

ISI claimed that it included some insurgent groups, in addition to AQI, such as Jaish al-Fatahin, Jund al-Sahaba, Katbiyan Ansar Al-Tawhid wal Sunnah, and Jaish al Taiifa al Mansoura. They all fall under the umbrella term "Islamic State in Iraq."

Around 2007, ISI effectively took over the Dora district in southern Baghdad, introduced strict Sharia law, and expelled the Assyrian Christians who refused to pay the "jizya," the tax imposed on all non-Muslims living under Muslim rule. By the end of the year, ISI was driven out by coalition forces, and some of the churches were reopened, but many Assyrian Christians did not return.

As the Iraqi government increasingly came under the control of the Shiite majority, ISI continued its bombing campaign in Baghdad and Basra, mainly targeting Shiite neighborhoods and mosques. In 2009, US forces began withdrawing from major cities, and the attacks peaked when AQI attempted an uprising against Iraqi security forces. They suffered heavy losses, particularly in their leadership, as both Abu Ayyub al Masri and Abu Abdullah al Rashid al Baghdadi were killed in 2010. General Odierno declared that al-Qaeda in Iraq was now broken and cut off from the actual leadership of al-Qaeda in Pakistan.

At this time, Abu Du'a, aka Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, took over. His real name is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al Badri. He is now the leader of the Islamic State and there is a $10 million bounty on his head. Only Zawahiri is rewarded more for any information leading to his death or capture.

After the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2012, ISI was able to recover. This resulted in massive attacks during the provincial elections in April 2013, with approximately 120 people killed within a week. The Islamic State in Iraq showed that it could challenge the Iraqi security forces with impunity.

As the al-Nusra Front became increasingly important in the Syrian civil war in late 2012, experts suspected, both for their tactics and methods, that they might somehow be connected to the Islamic State in Iraq. This suspicion was well-founded, as al-Baghdadi publicly stated that ISI had been supporting al-Nusra financially and organizationally from the beginning. But this was not enough for al-Baghdadi. He declared that ISI and al-Nusra were no longer two separate groups but now stood under the common banner of the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). al Baghdadi not only announced this merger but also traveled to Aleppo in Syria to open ISIS offices there. The Emir of al-Nusra, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, rejected the formation of this new organization and instead pledged allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri. Therefore, Zawahiri theoretically determined over two different units, but al-Baghdadi, like his predecessor Zarkawi, rejected being overseen by this Emir.

In response, most of the international fighters from al-Nusra joined ISIS. ISIS itself quickly became unpopular in Syria for attacking other opposition groups (killing commanders with suicide bombers, taking over the enemy's weapons), to the point that the opposition decided to launch an offensive against ISIS. In May 2013, ISIS seized the Syrian city of Raqqa from al-Nusra, which has now become the capital of the Islamic State. With the offensive in Iraq, al-Baghdadi declared himself as Caliph. He is now the "Leader of the Believers" and of a state, no longer a militia leader. The strength that ISIS, now as the Islamic State (IS), is showing is attracting many new fighters to them, both locally and internationally.

PETER NEALEN is a former Reconnaissance Marine and Iraq and Afghanistan veteran. The article was originally published on the US Special Operations network SOFREP.com.

Reprinted with permission from SOFREP.com