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Conflicts

UKRAINE: THE SITUATION 426 - APRIL 23, 2023

This report by ISW assesses the current Russian Order of Battle in Ukraine, evaluating offensive and defensive capabilities of Russian troop groupings. It discusses factors that could impede Russian defensive operations in case of a counteroffensive by Ukraine. Full analysis available at LINK.

04/24/2023  By Redaktion

The ISW is releasing a special edition of the campaign assessment today. This report outlines the current Russian Order of Battle (ORBAT) in Ukraine, evaluates the offensive and defensive capabilities of Russian troop groupings along the front, and discusses key factors that could hinder Russian defensive operations in the event of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

This report is based on a set of assumptions about Ukrainian capabilities that ISW does not seek to assess or report on in principle. It assumes in particular that Ukraine will be able to conduct a coordinated mechanized offensive operation with multiple brigades, fully utilizing the nine brigades reportedly being prepared for this operation. This task is enormous and greater than any offensive efforts Ukraine has undertaken before (for example, reports suggest that four Ukrainian brigades were used in the counteroffensive in Kharkiv). It is also assumed that Ukraine has integrated enough tanks and armored personnel carriers of various types into its units to support extensive mechanized maneuvers, that Ukrainian mechanized units have sufficient ammunition of all kinds, including artillery, and that Ukraine will be able to carry out precision strikes over long distances with HIMARS and other similar systems integrated into and supporting maneuver operations, as it has already done. Furthermore, it is assumed that Ukrainian forces have the necessary mine-clearing and bridging capabilities to move relatively quickly through prepared defensive positions.

Given the intensity with which Ukraine reportedly has been preparing for this operation and the time and equipment required, which has reportedly been provided to Ukrainian forces by Western countries, ISW sees no reason to question these assumptions. However, if a significant number of these assumptions prove to be invalid, some of the following assessments and observations would also be invalidated, and the prospects of the Russians holding their lines would be better than depicted below. ISW does not provide an assessment or evidence for these assumptions, and therefore does not offer a specific forecast on the nature, scope, location, duration, or outcome of the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive. Ukraine has attractive options for offensive operations along the entire line, and in ISW's view, the information presented in this report or ISW's observations below do not definitively indicate that Ukrainian forces will attack in any one area. HERE is the current and complete assessment of the Russian troop deployment in Ukraine available directly from ISW.

The full Russian Offensive Update 426 is available directly from UNDERSTANDING WAR.

UNDERSTANDING WAR online

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