The situation 1317 – October 26, 2025

1. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continue to make exaggerated claims of battlefield victories while demonstrating that the Kremlin remains committed to seizing the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
2. Russian milbloggers widely denied Gerasimov’s claims.
3. The Kremlin is exploiting Russia’s recent reliance on infiltration missions and the absence of contiguous front lines in some tactical areas, and the resulting interspersal of forces to make exaggerated battlefield claims.
4. Putin attempted to justify Russia’s slow pace of advance because of Russian concern for civilian safety and casualties.
5. Russia continues to issue explicit nuclear threats as part of a multi-pronged effort seeking to deter continued US pressure on Russia and support for Ukraine.
6. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev stated outright that Russia has not deviated from its 2021-2022 original war aims and that Russia continues to seek control of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
7. The Russian economy is showing its first signs of stagnation in manufacturing sectors critical to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
8. Russian regional authorities continue reducing one-time recruitment payments, supporting ISW’s forecast that Russia may begin compulsory recruitment of reservists in the face of mounting economic strain.
9. Russian forces continue to launch long-range glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian cities.
10. European officials continue to report on Russian hybrid operations in Europe over the past several years.
11. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Siversk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

The full update of the Russian offensive 1317 is available on UNDERSTANDING WAR