The Russian tactics are changing as lessons are learned from military failures in the war in Ukraine. A RUSI study – download link below – explains what is changing.

Summary
The extent of Russian losses in 2012, combined with the confrontation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with NATO systems they had not previously encountered, has led to significant deviations in Russian operations from Russian doctrine. This report aims to outline how Russian forces have adapted their tactics in the Ukraine conflict and the challenges this poses for the Ukrainian military.

Russian infantry tactics have shifted from the use of unified tactical battalion groups as combined combat units to a layered organization based on functions, consisting of line, assault, special, and disposable troops. These are grouped into task-oriented formations. Line infantry is mainly used for securing ground and defensive operations. Disposable infantry is used in ongoing skirmishes to either locate Ukrainian firing positions, which are then attacked by special infantry, or to identify weaknesses in the Ukrainian defense that are then targeted. Losses are distributed very unevenly among these functions. The greatest weakness of Russian infantry units is low morale, leading to poor unit cohesion and cooperation between units.

The Russian engineer troops have proven to be one of the strongest branches of the Russian Army. Russian engineers have constructed complex obstacles and field fortifications along the entire front, including reinforced concrete trenches and command bunkers, wire entanglements, hedgehogs, tank ditches, and complex minefields. The Russians extensively lay anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, the latter often with multiple triggering mechanisms to complicate crossing. These defensive structures present a significant tactical challenge for Ukrainian offensive operations.

The Russian armor forces are rarely used for breakthrough attempts. Instead, armor is primarily used for fire support to accurately target Ukrainian positions. Russia has begun equipping its vehicles with thermal camouflage, and through a series of other modifications and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) has significantly reduced the visibility of tanks at a distance. These measures have also reduced the probability of hit of a range of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) at distances greater than 1,400m.

The Russian artillery, following the destruction of its ammunition stocks and command and control infrastructure by Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) in July 2022, has significantly improved its reconnaissance complex. This has led to much closer integration of multiple UAVs directly supporting firing-authorized commanders. Russian artillery has also enhanced its ability to fire from multiple positions and move, making it less vulnerable to counter-battery fire. The key system enabling this coordination appears to be the Strelets system. The availability of ammunition and cannons has shifted Russian firepower from 152mm howitzers to 120mm mortars. Responsive Russian fire poses the greatest challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations. Russian artillery increasingly relies on loitering munitions for counter-battery fire.

The Russian electronic warfare (EW) remains strong, with roughly one major system per 10km of front. These systems are heavily focused on combating UAVs and tend not to diminish their effectiveness. Ukrainian drone losses are still around 10,000 per month. Russian air defense also seems capable of intercepting and decrypting real-time tactical communication systems with 256-bit encryption from the Ukrainian company Motorola, widely used by Ukrainian forces.

Russian air defense has also significantly increased in efficiency, now built around known and relatively static locations and well networked. While Russia has repeatedly had difficulties reacting to new threats, it has adapted over time. According to the Ukrainian military, Russian air defense is now intercepting some of the GMLRS strikes, as Russian point defense systems directly link to a superior radar.

The Russian Air Force remains restricted to long-range actions, ranging from fast S-8 salvos against Ukrainian formation points to FAB-500 glide bombs deployed from medium altitudes with a range of up to 70km. The Ukrainian military notes that Russia has a large stockpile of FAB-500 and is systematically upgrading them with glide bombs. Despite their limited precision, this ammunition poses a serious threat due to its size. Russian air forces remain a real force and a major threat to advancing Ukrainian forces, even though they are currently unable to penetrate Ukrainian air defense.

An overview of Russian adaptation shows that the military is able to enhance and develop the use of key systems. There are signs of a centralized process for identifying shortcomings in deployment and developing remedies. However, much of these adaptations are reactive, aiming to address serious deficiencies within Russian units. The result is a structure that over time becomes better equipped to handle the problems it is immediately facing, but also struggles to anticipate new threats. This leads to the conclusion that Russian forces present a significant challenge in defense for Ukrainian forces. However, if Ukraine manages to disrupt Russian defenses and impose a dynamic situation, Russian units are likely to quickly lose coordination. Changes in the air combat environment have, for example, quickly led to incidents of Russian fratricide.

"Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine" – DOWNLOAD HERE for free