Mercenary, PMC, PSC ... Privatization of war?

What's all this about: Mercenaries? Private Military Contractors (PMC)? Private Security Contractors (PSC)? A confusing world of modern warfare is unfolding, with the state being just one part of it. The article "Privatization of War? Problem Areas of the Use of Private Military and Security Companies in Modern Warfare" provides an excellent insight into the complex situation and explains what is what.

Private military and security companies play an important role in modern warfare. While private security actors are not a new phenomenon, they can be traced back to ancient times. For example, in Greece, before the beginning of our era, there were mercenary units and their leaders known as "Condottieri."[1] Since the end of the Cold War, the number of such companies and the scope of activities they undertake have significantly increased. In 2010, over 260,000 employees of private military and security companies were working for US government agencies in Afghanistan and Iraq alone, operating in many functions alongside state militaries.[2] They assisted, for example, in the protection of bases, personal security, military training of the new Afghan and Iraqi armed forces, military logistics and transportation in the operational areas, repair of weapon systems, base construction, and troop supply.

Supporters of the use of private military and security companies argue that they fill capacity gaps in state militaries and increase the effectiveness of military operations. However, the problem is that these companies are increasingly taking on central military tasks, yet their work in conflict zones is inadequately controlled. This can have negative consequences for international missions and local populations.

A frequently cited negative example is the actions of the US company Blackwater, which has since been renamed Academi. For example, in September 2007, Blackwater employees killed 14 unarmed Iraqi civilians at the busy Nissor Square in Baghdad when they opened fire on the crowd - they later claimed self-defense, as they mistook the driver of an approaching car for a suicide bomber. But other internationally active private military and security companies such as the US companies DynCorp and Triple Canopy have also become known for aggressive behavior and endangering civilians in Iraq.

These scandals involving individual companies have led the media and academia to critically examine the phenomenon of private military and security companies in the context of modern warfare. However, the privatization of security in armed conflicts mostly occurs far from the public eye of Western interventionist states. It is these states that are driving this development through the increasing outsourcing of military and security functions.

To contribute to a greater awareness of the problem, we would like to explain in this article what private military and security companies are and how they differ from classical mercenarism. We will then look at the reasons for the increased use of private military and security companies in armed conflicts and discuss the implications.

Mercenaries or Business Enterprises?

In the media, employees of private military and security companies are often referred to as mercenaries. However, according to national laws and international conventions, they are not mercenaries but employees of legal service companies. The international law definition of mercenaries, as stated in Article 47 of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 and the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries of 1989, is very narrowly defined and requires, among other things, recruitment for combat, direct participation in hostilities, and individual profit motivation. These criteria are not met by the employees of modern private military and security companies or cannot at least be conclusively proven.[3] They also differ from historical forms of mercenaries as individual fighters, as seen in numerous conflicts on the African continent in the 1960s. Unlike traditional mercenaries, they are embedded in a corporate structure and not acting independently; thus, individual profit is subordinated to entrepreneurial interests and principles.

Despite the finding that employees of modern private military and security companies are not mercenaries under international law, there is no uniform definition or categorization of such companies. In both political debates and national and international regulations, the term "private military and security company" is defined differently. This leads to varying assessments of the size of the industry, its contribution to modern warfare, and the associated impacts.

Often, there are typologies that differentiate private military and security companies based on various services. Both in academia and politics, private "security companies" that protect facilities or individuals are contrasted with private "military companies" that fulfill military functions and provide training. Such a distinction is problematic because many international private military and security companies offer a wide range of services. The portfolio of companies like the US Constellis Group, which includes Academi, includes not only security, personal protection, training, consulting, risk management, and security technology but also military logistics and maintenance, communication, as well as base construction and supply. Additionally, the transition between individual tasks can be fluid. For example, armed military engagements can occur during the protection of individuals or convoys in a conflict zone.

At the same time, the same companies that are used in the context of modern warfare are also active in conflict-free OECD countries. For example, the world's largest private military and security company, the British company G4S, with an annual turnover of ten billion US dollars and over 600,000 employees in over 110 countries, protects British diplomats in Afghanistan and operates a deportation center in Austria. [4]

Due to the blending of military and security tasks in practice, the so-called Montreux Document, a 2008 declaration of principles on the use of private military and security companies, which has been signed by 53 countries as well as NATO, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, proposes a comprehensive definition. Private military and security companies are defined as "private business enterprises that provide military and/or security services (...). Military and security services include, in particular, armed protection and security of persons and objects such as convoys, buildings, and other sites, maintenance and operation of weapon systems, internment of prisoners, as well as advice or training of local forces and security personnel." [5]

Legal Limits

The laws of war do not prohibit the use of private military and security companies, but they establish the rights and duties of their personnel in armed conflicts. For this purpose, the laws of war distinguish between combatants and civilians. [6] While the status of personnel of a private military and security company must be determined on a case-by-case basis, there is largely agreement that they are to be classified as civilians. [8] As such, they are allowed to use weapons only for self-defense. Regardless of their status, personnel of private military and security companies are obligated to comply with the provisions of international humanitarian law and international human rights norms, and can be criminally prosecuted if suspected of violations.

The Montreux Document, which aims to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights in the use of private military and security companies, emphasizes the responsibility of states for enforcing international legal rules in the behavior of these companies. It holds states that deploy private military and security companies in conflict zones, as well as states where such companies are registered as businesses, accountable.

In the context of modern warfare, states are the main customers of private military and security companies, especially the United States. In Iraq and Afghanistan, more personnel from such companies were deployed than soldiers. [9] European states also commission private military and security companies as part of international military missions, such as the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany. They undertake tasks for the German Armed Forces in areas such as transportation, logistics, catering, maintenance, and repair. [10] International organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union also utilize the services of private military and security companies for tasks such as risk assessment, surveillance, and logistics. Companies, media, and humanitarian aid organizations engage such firms for their work in conflict areas, particularly for the protection of their facilities and personnel or their security training.

There are only limited national laws restricting the deployment and conduct of private military and security companies in conflict zones. Switzerland is one of the few countries that has enacted a law regulating them, even though few such firms are based there. Since September 2015, private military and security companies based in Switzerland that wish to provide services abroad must inform the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in advance. Following a review, the ministry may grant or deny permission. Direct involvement in combat operations is generally prohibited. [11] The United States has various regulations and laws affecting private military and security companies and their personnel, such as for contracting with such firms by US government agencies and monitoring them during related operations. Additionally, there is a licensing system for private military and security companies wishing to provide services abroad for foreign clients. In contrast, there are no state regulations for private military and security companies in Germany and the United Kingdom.

Explanations for a New Phenomenon

Different reasons explain the unprecedented extent of the use of Private Military and Security Companies in armed conflicts. This includes, in particular, the personnel shortage in Western armed forces. In anticipation of a peace dividend, many states reduced their military expenditures and capacity after the end of the Cold War. For example, the United States reduced the size of its armed forces by a third between 1987 and 1997.[12] Western troops are therefore not able to independently carry out the numerous interventions in armed conflicts since the early 1990s. To fill these personnel gaps, states rely on Private Military and Security Companies.

Another reason for the growth of the private military and security industry is the technologization of warfare. The expertise for the development, operation, and maintenance of weapons and weapon systems has shifted from the public to the private sector. Military technology is mainly developed by private companies, which often are the only ones capable of operating these devices. This creates military dependencies on Private Military and Security Companies, whose employees must now also be deployed in conflict regions.

From a neoliberal perspective, it is also argued that security can be provided more cost-effectively through the market. However, this assumption is controversial. Numerous studies, including those by the United States Government Accountability Office, show that the use of Private Military and Security Companies can lead to fraud and waste instead of cost savings and efficiency improvements.[13] For example, the US State Department paid Private Military and Security firm DynCorp $43 million to build a facility to accommodate police trainers in Iraq, even though the building was never used. The company also received an additional $30 million from the US government for equipment without ever being able to provide evidence of the purpose of these funds.[14]

Fraud and waste are facilitated by structural factors. Private Military and Security Companies are sometimes granted so-called IDIQ contracts (indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity), which incentivize inflating the need for personnel and equipment because no limits are contractually specified. Bilateral monopolistic situations between the United States and Private Military and Security Companies prevent cost-reducing competition. Only a few companies are large enough to fulfill IDIQ contracts. But even outside the US, the modalities of awarding contracts to Private Military and Security Companies can lead to potential waste. In Germany, insufficient competition led to problems with the company Ecolog, which provided the German armed forces in Afghanistan with laundry services, waste disposal, containers, and fuels and continued to receive new orders for years without public tenders despite poor performance.[15]

Finally, Private Military and Security Companies can reduce the political costs associated with involvement in an armed conflict. On one hand, employees of such companies killed in action are not officially counted in statistics or buried with military honors, so the public rarely takes notice. On the other hand, Western governments, including the German government, do not have to inform their parliaments about the commissioning of Private Military and Security Companies or seek their approval. Therefore, governments can expand their scope of action through the use of such companies and portray their level of involvement in an armed conflict as lower than it actually is.[16] This is particularly relevant when national parliaments or citizens are skeptical or opposed to such involvement.

Deployment Issues

The problems associated with the deployment of Private Military and Security Companies in armed conflicts are complex. In commercial services in the logistical and technical sectors, the cases of corruption, fraud, and waste already described can have negative consequences for the efficiency and effectiveness of military missions. The increasing dependence of the armed forces on Private Military and Security Companies is another risk factor. If the armed forces can no longer (or no longer) carry out individual tasks such as the maintenance of weapon systems or military logistics themselves, this means that replacing Private Military and Security Companies, even with poor performance, can be difficult. Furthermore, the establishment of state police and military units in the country of deployment can be hampered when Private Military and Security Companies and state security actors compete for qualified personnel in crisis areas.

In conflict zones, it is primarily the behavior of armed security service providers that can cause problems for the civilian population and thus for the acceptance and success of a mission. In Afghanistan, local armed Private Military and Security Companies that were supposed to protect convoys of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) between Kabul and Kandahar were not only inadvertently a threat to villagers along this route because their employees could not distinguish between civilians and Taliban. The companies also actively exploited their position to exploit and intimidate the population. According to reports from the United Nations, the illegal stopping and "taxing" of civilians at roadblocks set up by Private Military and Security Companies was a widespread practice.[17] Cases of extortion, kidnapping, torture, theft, looting, as well as drug and weapons smuggling by Private Military and Security Companies are also known.[18] Moreover, Afghan companies serving as subcontractors to intervention forces were sometimes involved in local power struggles, where competitors and their supporters were deliberately targeted for killing.[19]

The insufficient control and regulation of the private military and security industry are essential reasons for these problems. The authorities responsible for contract management have weak control and monitoring capabilities in conflict areas. Additionally, by contracting general contractors such as the US construction company KBR, the Swiss company Supreme, and the German consulting firm Xeless, they find it difficult to keep track of who is actually providing certain services in the operational area. Most general contractors employ a variety of local subcontractors, who in turn rely on private security firms for their protection. This creates long and difficult-to-control chains of contracts. In Afghanistan, for example, there are up to two additional companies between the ultimately executing military contractor and the original contractor. In some cases, this has led to international clients indirectly funding corrupt or criminal security companies or the Taliban. [20]

Contract chains contribute to unclear responsibilities for controlling the actors at subordinate levels. Clients such as NATO or the European Union only monitor companies at the first level of contracting in practice, as this significantly reduces their efforts in establishing and implementing control mechanisms. Subcontractors are rarely controlled. If victims of crimes committed by the ultimately operating companies are unable to identify these companies, it often leads to impunity for the companies and their employees.

Furthermore, due to the lack of or weak rule of law structures in conflict areas, it is difficult to hold employees of private military and security companies accountable for crimes committed on-site. In Iraq, private military and security companies operating there enjoyed immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law until the end of 2008, according to a decree by the Coalition Provisional Authority. In such cases, employees of private military and security companies should be held accountable in their home countries. The employees of the company Blackwater, who shot 14 Iraqis in Nissor Square in Baghdad, were sentenced to partial life imprisonment by a US court in April 2015. [21] However, only a few states actually pursue crimes committed abroad.

Towards International Regulation?

Private military and security companies influence the course of current conflicts due to their important role. They can contribute not only to pacification but also to the reinforcement or prolongation of conflicts. States hope to save costs and expand their scope of action through the use of private military and security companies. However, the lack of national and international controls and regulations favors corruption, fraud, and inefficiency. Furthermore, private military and security companies can hinder the establishment of stable state structures and contribute to violence against the local population. The goals and interests of Western intervention states and the success of military missions can thus be jeopardized by private military and security companies.

It is urgent that states fulfill their responsibility to control these companies and sanction companies and employees for misconduct. To prevent regulatory gaps due to different national laws and standards, regulation should take place at the international level.

A working group of the United Nations has presented a draft for an international convention within the framework of the work of the UN Human Rights Council. This confirms that states are responsible for ensuring that private military and security companies comply with human rights and international law and also includes a prohibition on “inherently governmental functions. [22] Many Western governments, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, are skeptical about a binding international regulation because they fear restrictions on their private military and security industries. Accordingly, states cannot agree on the current proposal of the working group. The German government “does not see the Human Rights Council of the United Nations as the appropriate forum for the development of an international agreement to regulate the activities of private military and security companies. [23] Moreover, the German government has repeatedly emphasized that existing regulations are sufficient. [24]

Andrea Schneiker

is Assistant Professor of Political Science with a focus on International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Siegen and a member of the research network “Private Security Research.“ [email protected]
About the Author

Elke Krahmann

is Professor of International Political Studies at the Faculty of Economics at the University of Witten/Herdecke. [email protected]

The image level to the article shows promotional images from the movie "The Wild Geese" (1978). The classic film is set in Africa and depicts a specific type of Western mercenaries. On behalf of a banker, Ex-General Faulkner assembles a mercenary team to rescue the President of the African country of Zembala. He is held captive by rebels. The star-studded cast includes Richard Burton, Roger Moore, and Hardy Krüger. The film is available on Amazon Prime (Euro 2.99) or remastered Blue Ray for 13.99.

Footnotes

1.See Martin Zimmermann, Warlords in Antiquity, in: Stig Förster/Christian Jansen/Günther Kronenbitter (eds.), Return of the Condottieri? War and Military between State Monopoly and Privatization: From Antiquity to the Present, Paderborn 2010.

2.See Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks: Final Report to Congress, Arlington 2011, p. 2.

3.See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Contemporary Challenges to IHL – Privatization of War: Overview, 10.12.2013, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/contemporary-challenges-for-ihl/privatization-war/overview-privatization.htm«.

4.See G4S, G4S Wins Security Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 11.9.2015, http://www.g4s.com/en/Media%20Centre/News/2015/09/11/G4S%20wins%20contracts%20in%20Iraq%20and%20Afghanistan/.aspx«; ders., G4S Wins Ground-Breaking Austrian Government Contract, 12.9.2013, http://www.g4s.com/en/Media%20Centre/News/2013/09/12/G4S%20wins%20ground-breaking%20Austrian%20Government%20contract«.

5.The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict, 17.9.2008, p. 9, http://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/Montreux-Broschuere_en.pdf«.

6.See the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 1977.

7.See Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Private Military/Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law, in: International Review of the Red Cross 863/2006, p. 525–572, here p. 535.

8.See ICRC (Note 3).

9.See Commission on Wartime Contracting (Note 2), p. 20.

10.See Elke Krahmann/Cornelius Friesendorf, Debatte vertagt? Militär- und Sicherheitsfirmen in deutschen Auslandseinsätzen, Frankfurt/M. 2011.

11.See Federal Department of Justice and Police, Private Security Services Abroad will be Regulated from 1 September 2015, 24.6.2015, http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/de/home/aktuell/news/2015/2015-06-240.html«.

12.David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, London 1998, p. 28.

13.See e.g. US Government Accountability Office, Contract Management: DOD Vulnerabilities to Contracting Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, GAO-06-838R, 7.7.2006, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06838r.pdf«.

14.See Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Contract Number S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order 0338, For the Iraqi Police Training Program Support, 30.1.2007.

15.See Krahmann/Friesendorf (Note 10), p. 13.

16.See Nicole Deitelhoff/Anna Geis, Why Reforms Should Not Solely Be Measured by Increased Effectiveness, in: Klaus Dieter Wolf (ed.), State and Society – Capable of Reform?, Baden-Baden 2007, p. 303–327, here p. 321.

17.See UN, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination: Addendum Mission to Afghanistan, 14.6.2010, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/25/Add. 2, p. 22.

18.See Ibid.; House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan: Report by the Majority Staff, Washington D.C. 22.6.2010, p. 3; John S. Rønnevik, Who Runs This Town? Private Security Companies and Their Effect on Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, Master's Thesis, University of Bergen 2012.

19.See UN (Note 17), p. 24.

20.See Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan. Report Together with Additional Views, Washington D.C. 28.9.2010.

21.See Matt Apuzzo, Ex-Blackwater Guards Given Long Terms for Killing Iraqis, 13.4.2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/us/ex-blackwater-guards-sentenced-to-prison-in-2007-killings-of-iraqi-civilians.html?_r=0«.

22.See UN, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, 25.8.2010, UN Doc. A/65/325.

23.Deutscher Bundestag, Bundestagsdrucksache 17/7166, 27.9.2011, S. 2; see ders., Bundestagsdrucksache 17/6780, 5.8.2011.

24.See Deutscher Bundestag, Bundestagsdrucksache 16/1296, 26.4.2006; ders., Bundestagsdrucksache 17/4012, 1.11.2010; ders., Bundestagsdrucksache 17/6780, 5.8.2011.

This text is published under the Creative Commons license „CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 DE – Attribution – Non-Commercial – No Derivative Works 3.0 Germany“. Authors: Andrea Schneiker, Elke Krahmann for Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte/bpb.de