Rio de Janeiro 2016: The security of the Games

Despite all the sunshine and palm-tree panoramas, the basic danger of falling victim to a robbery in the Olympic country Brazil (especially in the slums/favelas of the big cities) is significantly higher than in Western Europe. The popular beaches and promenades in the neighborhoods Copacabana, Ipanema, Leblon, and the nightlife district Lapa are repeatedly scenes of thefts and robberies, even during the day. A previously nearly unknown threat in Brazil appears in the face of international terrorism.

The threat level is unique, as for the first time in the history of the Olympic Games, they are taking place in a South American country. Brazil has managed to outperform numerous favorites and will therefore host the Olympic Games from August 5-21 and then the Paralympic Games 2016 from September 7-18, 2016. The host of the XXXI Games is the second largest city in Brazil, Rio de Janeiro. The capital of the eponymous state is home to approximately 6.5 million people on an area of 1,255 km². It is located on the picturesque Guanabara Bay in the southeast of the country and is a popular tourist destination. The 32 competition venues are spread across the four Olympic Zones in Barra, Copacabana, Deodoro, and Maracanã, with the Olympic Village located near the Olympic Park in Barra. The Games are perceived in the international public (also thanks to the media) as a colorful and joyful event.

In Rio, Brazil maintains an Anti-Terror Center under the responsibility of the Brazilian Special Operations Command BOPE (Batalhao Operacoes Policais Especais), whose main areas of operation are the numerous favelas. During the Olympic Games, employees of intelligence services from France, Great Britain, and the USA also coordinate their forces and operational measures from there.

Thomas Schröder founded the security company CETTAS International in 1999. As a former paratrooper and commando soldier (B1) of the German Bundeswehr, he brought profound skills and knowledge and quickly established himself as a service provider in security matters with the security authorities and upscale business clientele. In a spacious academy near the capital Belo Horizonte, in the southeast of the state of Minas Gerais, he regularly trains private, military, and governmental security personnel, together with the partner company CETTAS Europe, in the areas of personal protection and access techniques. On SPARTANAT, he shares his profound insights into the general threat situation and the security concept for the ongoing 2016 Olympic Games.

SPARTANAT: What shadows do the preparations for a functioning security structure cast after the devastating terrorist attacks in Paris, Belgium, and currently Germany?

Schröder: We observe various efforts by the state and security forces to prepare for possible problems during the Games. However, due to the everyday problems of public security organs to control or combat normal crime, I have doubts about whether the skills and logistical potential are sufficient. Various exercises and simulations by the different security forces, whether police, army, or others, have shown shortcomings for insiders. In essential areas: too little material and technology, too short training and exercise sequences. In various projects, only brief training sessions were conducted within the national units (agencies), based on personal knowledge and media reports, the longest training sequence I know of happened during a 5-day cross-training with the Brazilian Special Forces in Goiania (State of Goias), otherwise training is likely done internally within the units. Numerous film recordings show significant deficiencies and sometimes amateurish exercise sections. At the WM Stadium in Belo Horizonte, a major exercise was conducted a few months ago involving the Army (SF), Military Police with GATE participation (SWAT state police), and the Federal Police. Approximately 100 operatives, two helicopters, and a simulation of a terrorist situation with 60 extras from the university for victim portrayal, in the third largest football stadium in the world. We have also been supporting the police and security forces for years with our training programs.

Brazil has almost no experience in dealing with political or religious terrorism, and certainly not with the characteristics of the Islamic State. However, experiences in combating organized crime are certainly hard to beat.

SPARTANAT: What experiences is the security concept built on?

Schröder: Public life in Brazil has almost no experience in dealing with political or religious terrorism, and certainly not with the characteristics of the Islamic State. Despite relatively high crime rates, these scenarios have not been part of the daily reality.

Experiences in combating organized crime, especially with the particularities of the infrastructure of some of the largest favelas (townships) in Latin America, are certainly hard to top. The use of war weapons by the dealer gangs (which has already led to police helicopter shootings) is certainly rare but happens. Specialized units (BOPE - Military Police RJ, CORE - Civil Police - RJ) certainly have solid knowledge for these areas, but whether these experiences are enough to face situations and scenarios of international terrorism is questionable.

What might be worth mentioning in this context is a measure initiated by the Security Superintendent of the State of Rio de Janeiro (Secretario de Segurança) Jose Mariano Beltrame. Some time ago, Rio was divided by the work of the Military Police Intelligence Service (Serviço de Inteligencia Policia Militar) into different danger zones. There are now a total of 84 regions defined by security standards and the number of robbery murders that have taken place there. These regions also include well-known tourist areas in the "Interior", outside the capital, essentially in the countryside, such as Angra dos Reis, which will attract many visitors to the Games due to its variety of islands and tourist attractions.

Since January 2016, a total of 61 police officers have died in battle in these regions, of which 28 were off-duty, killed in acts of revenge and within the framework of "latrocinios", that is, robberies. The study of the number of crimes in the respective sectors promises more effective prevention and containment of violence. However, the measure is widely seen as political activism, and the result is more than questionable, as confirmed to me by some colleagues and friends in the police in Rio.

SPARTANAT: Is the infrastructure (roads, highways, subways) of the venues prepared enough for the flood of tourists and visitors?

Schröder: Up to now, various problems and a lack of information for international tourists have also been reported by local media.

The majority of sports venues can be reached by public transportation, but at main locations such as the central bus station (Rodoviaria principal) and the main metro station (Deodoro), close to the "Parque Radical", one of the central venues of the Games, multilingual information boards and signs are still missing. Various TV stations have already conducted tests with tourists and confirmed their difficulties in reaching various destinations, noting that in Rio and São Paulo, tragic deaths of locals and tourists have occurred for years due to lack of local knowledge, with individuals accidentally entering a favela entrance (Boca do Fumo), mistaken for police officers, and shot.

As for the main access roads from the airports, the following can be said: Both the Linha Amarelo (Yellow Line) and the Linha Vermelho (Red Line), which are the main connections from the International Airport Litoral to the center and the Vila Olimpica, pass through areas that can be considered crisis areas from a security perspective. The protective walls erected along the sides have been previously promoted as noise barriers or pedestrian protection, but in reality, Rio residents know that large-caliber tracer bullets regularly pass between favelas along these Linhas, across the direction of traffic, causing numerous casualties among randomly passing residents. Particularly tragic was the death last month of the young doctor Gisele Palhares Gouveia, 34 years old. She was a victim of an armed robbery on the Linha Vermelha during heavy traffic and was killed with two gunshots to the head. This is just one case among many others.

To ensure security in the metropolis, security forces have been temporarily strengthened. I do not want to commit to numbers from the press here, but according to insiders, approximately 8,300.

A provisional distribution of forces is planned as follows:

1. The main roads Linha Vermalha and Linha Amarela will receive military security.
2. Specifically, the Bairro Copacabana will have a significant presence of all security forces.
3. Army: Guards the Transolimpica, the entire route, Barra da Tijuca (upscale beaches and areas in the south of Rio, near the game venues), Deodoro (main train station) and Maracana Stadium, other expressways and tunnels in the city area, external security perimeter of the airports, and 7 train stations.
4. Navy: Patrols the Orla (coastal stretch) from Guaratiba to Niteroi, Guanabara Bay, and the Rodrigo de Freitas Lake, as well as the Olympic routes from Caju to São Conrado.
5. Air Force: Responsible for internal security of airports and supports the Army (Heer) in external security.
6. Força Nacional: (Special intervention and support unit made up of personnel selected and specially trained from all other police forces) Secures within the game venues, Olympic Park, Maracana Stadium, Engenhão.
7. Policia Militar RJ/Policia Civil RJ: Carry out their routine tasks in the conventional and special areas, patrol Rio de Janeiro, and support other security forces when needed.

Since the latter units are most familiar with the normal situation in Rio, it seems to be a counterproductive decision.

Arrastões are so-called lightning attacks. In the case of traffic jams, dozens of criminals armed with assault rifles, submachine guns, etc., suddenly appear from nearby favelas and rob everything they can get their hands on in a short time.

From a security perspective, it is worth mentioning the so-called "Arrastões" on some important city highways and expressways in Rio. Arrastões are so-called lightning attacks. In the case of traffic jams, for example, on Avenida Brasil (a main thoroughfare), dozens of criminals armed with assault rifles, submachine guns, etc., suddenly emerge from nearby favelas and plunder (clean out) all occupants of vehicles, stealing everything they can quickly get hold of. In these cases, there have already been prolonged shootouts and scenes resembling civil war in recent times. Officials, athletes, and adventurous tourists should be prepared for this. These lightning attacks also occurred during the 2014 Pan American Games, but not on official event routes that were secured by police forces. There are also reports of cases where police or military personnel who live in close proximity to their "enemies" due to their own social situation. It can happen that they are controlled and searched by such gangs when entering their neighborhood. There was a case of a military serviceman who had his smartphone taken away and checked for photos. He was identified by uniformed photos and suffered severe reprisals. Perhaps an interesting note for military personnel from other countries is to delete such revealing information!

SPARTANAT: Do European media provide a realistic picture of the situations in Rio de Janeiro?

Schröder: I can hardly imagine that, as even for us here in Brazil, there is hardly any credible information from the press on various incidents and problems.

To obtain credible information about the current situation, investigative work would have to be done locally. The information on Zika virus, dengue, or political issues is quite poor and is likely to be considered manipulated in the interest of certain organizations. From a case in the family locally, I am well aware of the differences between government propaganda and the reality in public health care. Health is a privilege, especially in terms of status and standard of living. It is difficult to ascertain whether enough is actually being invested in prevention. The contamination rate and the number of deaths from, for example, dengue fever are high.

It is hoped that the number of infectious diseases, especially those transmitted by mosquitoes, will decrease during the Olympic Games due to the climate factor, we have winter!

SPARTANAT: What groups pose the greatest threat?

Schröder: There is always and clearly a general threat of procurement crime in Rio. We know that drug dealers belonging to organized crime here do not tolerate the extended activities of terrorist small groups in and around their territories, and even actively and aggressively oppose them. Therefore, a certain level of support for the security of normal tourists can be expected from this direction, so that they also remain as drug customers.

The biggest concern is, of course, a terrorist attack. The exposure of the first IS terrorist cell in Brazil through an operation of the Federal Police raises hopes that the security apparatus is beginning to work there as well.

Biggest concern is of course still a terrorist attack of any kind, which due to lack of experience would also be the most dangerous threat. The exposure of Brazil's first IS terrorist cell through an operation by Policia Federal raises hopes that the updated security apparatus and intelligence services will begin to function due to international pressure. However, the amateurish approach of the "terrorists" says little about the actual qualifications of our anti-terror forces.

SPARTANAT: What is the extent of threat that Brazilian and international security agencies are concerned about?

Schröder: Due to the activities of organized crime, there are a large number of war weapons in Rio de Janeiro. Rio has been living in an undeclared civil war for decades and shootings are part of everyday life. Whether terrorists are able to arm themselves from these arsenals is difficult to answer. In my estimation, probably not, as organized crime has no interest in attracting additional attention from security forces.

Explosives from the industrial sector are unfortunately very easy to obtain through robbery in Brazil. Thousands of explosive attacks on ATMs in recent years attest to this. Explosive emulsion and dynamite are almost easy to obtain in poorly guarded mining operations. I exclude the availability and use of ABC warfare agents based on my knowledge. It is more likely to expect a tactic of "small stabs" that can then be exaggerated in the media.

SPARTANAT: Which foreign authorities provide technical and operational support to Brazilian security agencies?

Schröder: It is known that there has been technical support of a preventive nature for some time. For example, there has been a branch of the American FBI in Rio for several years to advise security forces. To my knowledge, almost all participating countries are represented by task forces consisting of police, military, and intelligence services, and work closely with regional authorities. Thus, French security authorities (who also provided information on the preparations for attacks by the Brazilian "terror cell") and the FBI/USA are on site with a larger contingent. The USA also provided preparatory training for the paramilitary BOPE (Batalhaõ de Operações Policias Especiais) of the Policia Militar RJ and the Special Operations Command COT (Comando Operações Taticas) of Policia Federale.

There were also additional measures in the maritime sector for the combat swimmers of the Brazilian Navy's GRUMEC (Grupamento de Mergulhadores de Combate), under the observation of the US Navy Seals and members of the US DELTA-Force.

SPARTANAT: What importance is given in Brazil to the areas of civilian security business such as personal protection for VIPs/athletes/officials, driver services, event object protection, especially for the Olympic Games?

Schröder: The need for professional security forces is generally high. CETTAS International, as well as CETTAS Europe, actively work towards the specialization of operational forces in the public and private security sectors in Brazil and internationally, in line with the demands. We were able to gain valuable experience during the 2014 FIFA World Cup in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, which we can now draw on again. Additional training has been provided locally for officers of the "Policia Civil" and "Policia Federal" in the area of Tactical Shooting. This will take place in Rio de Janeiro in the normal course, as the security measures for athletes and officials are taken care of by the Federal Police. Our portfolio is more geared towards individuals who feel a heightened need for protection during the Games.

Since 2000, CETTAS Europe has been offering its specialized and mission-oriented training opportunities for security forces from all over Europe. The company focuses on conducting security-specific courses in the areas of personal protection/PMC, job-related shooting training, and maritime protection. A large portion of course participants are members of police and military units, as well as internationally operating security companies.

CETTAS International: cettas.com.br

CETTAS Europe: www.cettas.de