How Knowledge Is Changing the War

Research today makes no doubt that organizations such as the military “learn.” How such learning processes have unfolded in times of war and peace, however, remains largely unknown. In this study, Christian Stachelbeck examines the German Army as a learning organization between 1888 and 1926.

Tactical Learning in the Army Between the German Empire and the Weimar Republic

The study centers on the central question of the process of organizational learning as the acquisition, preservation, transfer, and application of tactical knowledge for warfare. It examines tactical learning in the German Army from the preparations for World War I, through the war itself (1914–1918), to its immediate postwar analysis during the Reichswehr era up to 1926. Based on the thesis that the German Army pursued an evolutionary and compromise-driven approach to learning, the study traces the development of a specific tactical “lessons learned” system and the structure of tactical training and continuing education for officers.

Lessons Learned and Mission Tactics

Drawing on a broad range of sources and taking into account the implementation of mission-oriented tactics, the author succeeds in providing insights into military learning processes that are both novel and illuminating. His findings undermine previous, overly one-sided interpretations of the German Army’s capacity for learning. The German Army was neither an organization unwilling to learn nor an exceptionally adaptable “genius of war” (Trevor M. Dupuy).

The Author

Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Christian Stachelbeck conducts research at the ZMSBw on the history of the German armed forces between 1871 and 1945, as well as on military learning processes.

Further information and an excerpt from the book can be found on the ZMSBw website.