Intelligence services (4): Agent Gridling - the other BVT affair

Adventurous sounding, but moderately substantive accusations that led to a report to the justice system, raids, endangerment of sensitive data, and a suspension: This is how many critics of the new leadership in the Ministry of the Interior describe their attempt to remove BVT Chief Peter Gridling. However, what does agency leader Gridling do when faced with a moderately substantive accusation against an employee? He quickly reports it to justice – leading to raids, endangerment of sensitive data, and a suspension. ADDENDUM on conflicts in the Austrian domestic intelligence service.

ADDENDUM was able to gain insight into investigation files concerning the case of a long-time employee at the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT). In November 2017, the BVT reported Mr. O. to the Vienna Public Prosecutor's Office. While the "incident report" was signed by another high-ranking BVT official, the content is largely based on Gridling's personal statements.

The main accusation is serious and sounds like it's from a James Bond thriller: O. may have passed on classified information to a foreign power. To whom remains undisclosed. However, reference is made to "numerous contacts with representatives of Russian intelligence services" that O. may have had in a previous professional capacity.

No evidence of data leakage

The investigation is still ongoing, so whether there is any truth to the criminal allegations has not been decided yet. However, for several months, nothing indicating data leakage was found. Additionally, two attempts to suspend the BVT employee failed in court. O. denies any wrongdoing and told investigators that it was a setup.

Regardless of the outcome of the case, it exemplifies how actions are typically taken in the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, responsible for the security of the Republic. Apparently, the – heavily criticized – rigorous actions by the Ministry of the Interior and justice against Gridling and other BVT officials are not so different from what the BVT leadership itself considers appropriate.

Gridling's Meetings with "Friends"

It all started somewhat mysteriously: In a personal conversation in January 2017, Gridling was allegedly informed by a "friendly partner service" that there were suspicions of an information leak at the BVT, and supposedly (…) O. was the source of the leak. This is what Gridling stated during a witness interview in the early morning hours of February 28, 2018 – summarized.

Everything Personal, Everything Verbal

In the interview regarding case O., Gridling also mentioned how in October 2017 – again in a personal conversation – the "partner service" expressed the same suspicions: "In principle, what was said in January was repeated." However, the accusations raised by the partner service were too vague for the BVT director. The "partner service" was asked to provide more concrete evidence to support the allegations. This was apparently promised by the "partner service," as stated in the BVT's report against O.

And indeed: A few weeks later, on November 19, 2017, the "partner service" requested an urgent meeting, which took place the next day. Gridling was the only representative from the BVT present. As a witness, he said: "I was verbally informed that information classified as 'secret' had been transmitted from a BVT account to O.'s private email account." According to the report, the "partner service" even specified the date: November 14, 2017, less than a week before the meeting with Gridling.

Suspension Lifted Twice

The BVT chief took action. Initially, the BVT internally examined O.'s work email account – and the IT department apparently found something. While the report did not provide details, three emails with a total of ten attachments that O. sent from his work account to a private Google address on November 14, 2017, were discovered. It may seem suspicious, but it's important to know that only highly ranked external employees at the BVT have access to their work emails. O. did not.

Moreover, the BVT not only filed a report but also suspended O. However, the Federal Administrative Court has already overturned the suspension twice. During the administrative process, O. claimed that BVT employees must be constantly reachable and have access to files at all times. Sending documents from the work to the personal email account and vice versa is common practice at the BVT, which is explicitly approved by the BVT director.

Quick Report without Detailed Examination

In November 2017, Gridling believed otherwise. Apparently, without checking the content of the emails and their attachments himself, the BVT filed a report. Essentially, the report echoed the accusations of the "friendly partner service," which cited an "intelligence source." In addition to the casual mention of alleged Russian contacts, the BVT informed the Public Prosecutor's Office that O. had been prematurely recalled from a foreign post during his 20-year career in state security due to activities that were not in line with his police duties.

The picture presented to the prosecutor seems clear: an unreliable officer with Russian contacts has diverted classified information. Consequently, the investigating authorities acted swiftly. The day after the report, the Federal Criminal Police requested authorization for telephone surveillance and observation. Another day later, on November 22, 2017, O. was intercepted on his way to a business trip, informed of the suspicions, suspended, and escorted home – leading to the first of three raids that would subsequently take place.

During the later search in the big BVT scandal, there was not even a written order. While one can argue that in such a sensitive area, swift action is necessary in the face of grave suspicions, the factual basis at that time seems weak: According to the file, O.'s work account was secured by investigators during the raids.

An evaluation could logically only occur afterward. The crucial point of whether the information in the emails was actually "classified," as claimed by the "friendly partner service," was not even remotely clarified. But more on that later.

Cover Identities Noted in the Case

The rigorous intervention of BVT and investigative authorities in this case also led to security interests being compromised. Soon, the criminal investigators found evidence of the role the BVT employee O. had at the BVT. He managed covert operations, one of the most sensitive areas in an intelligence service. While the BVT initially characterized the man in the report with a subtle but distinctly negative reference to his duty performance, they now saw someone else entirely: someone who had to pass regular high-level security checks and must inevitably be deemed reliable.

Otherwise, it would be hard to explain why the BVT equipped the man, O., with so-called "legend papers." Specifically, O. operated under two cover identities professionally. Addendum knows the cover names, but refrains from disclosing them to avoid compromising security interests. However, investigators simply wrote the names in the case file, which passed through many hands. The cover was thus likely blown.

Exposed Address for Covert Meetings

The potential damage is evident from the effort that went into one of the "legends" and its use. Under one of his cover names, O. had an ID card, a driver's license, an E-card, a bank account, and a credit card.

Through the account, he paid rent, home insurance, and electricity for a clandestine apartment – a secret meeting place – in the third district of Vienna. Not even the bank was aware that it was linked to the BVT. While Addendum knows the address of the apartment, it refrains from disclosing it for the reasons mentioned above. However, with the address in a prosecutor's file being passed between corruption investigators and prosecutors, the cover was blown.

Raid in the Secret BVT Office

That also applies to an apartment in the sixth district of Vienna. This was rented under a false name by the Ministry of the Interior or the BVT. In reality, it's a large office space of 150 square meters where several officers working on covert investigations are stationed. The address found its way into the investigation file under curious circumstances: during the raids immediately after the investigation began, not only was O.'s apartment in Vienna and his home outside of the capital searched, but his office was also to be searched – believing his desk was in the well-known BVT headquarters in the third district.

Ultimately, a voluntary inspection tolerated by the BVT took place at the actual workplace – the undercover office in the sixth district. This is a major security breach for the officers working there. Therefore, the search protocol initially pretended that the search took place in the third district. However, when O. contested the search, the actual address came to light.

It is noteworthy that the Vienna Public Prosecutor's Office – with court approval – initially ordered the search of O.'s supposed workplace in the BVT headquarters. This is similar to the approach taken in the main BVT case. However, the raids were subsequently overturned by the Higher Regional Court, stating that instead, the Ministry of the Interior should have been asked for assistance. As the case of O. shows, the Economic and Corruption Prosecutor's Office was not alone in holding a – now proven incorrect – legal opinion.

"Secret" Documents in the Investigative File

Returning to the security-questionable events in the O. case: the file also contains documents allegedly so classified that the officer should not have sent them to himself. However, even months after the start of the investigation, there was no clear determination regarding the actual status of the papers.

On November 24, 2017, two days after the raids and four days after the report, a "preliminary assessment of the ownership, transmission, and classification of the ten attachments" was made by a superior of the accused officer. The superior claimed that O. was not authorized to possess seven of the documents for his duties and not allowed to electronically send out nine of them from the BVT. These nine documents would be classified and subject to secrecy.

"All Legal"

O. himself stated during the administrative proceedings, which ended with the lifting of the suspension, that all the documents were legally in his possession, and not a single one was classified as "secret."

It's interesting to note that during his witness interview in February, Gridling could not immediately answer the question if the BVT had verified whether O. legally possessed the papers. It could be assumed that this was a basic requirement for such a serious accusation. However, the BVT later informed the investigators in writing on March 16, 2018: "There were no verifications because it is not known which classified documents O. possessed." Perhaps the right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing. Nevertheless, the initial verification by the superior in November 2017, which crucially forms the suspicion of the prosecutors, appears questionable. Yet, the authorities heavily rely on it.

Administrative Court Denies Grounds for Suspicion

Even the Federal Administrative Court, which has already twice lifted the suspension, remained unconvinced of any misconduct. In a decision from June 15, 2018, it stated: "The transmission of seven (sic!) emails to his private email address does not, in the court's view, establish a justified suspicion that the appellant unlawfully passed on state secrets to other intelligence services."

The justice system aims to shed more light on the matter. As reported by the "Kurier" a few weeks ago, a request for legal assistance was sent to the USA to access O.'s Google account. It remains to be seen if there was indeed a double agent at work here, who first sent papers from his work to his private address, only to pass them on to the Russians from there. Moreover, these were old papers that, according to O. during the administrative proceedings, he had access to since 2014. It would probably be the dumbest espionage operation of the 21st century.

Do Foreign Services Read Emails?

Around this case, several important questions arise: Has the BVT indeed adopted the practice of, even unintentionally, sending official documents outside? If so, this practice must urgently be stopped. And how does a "friendly partner service" know precisely when a BVT employee sends emails from his workplace?

A detailed inquiry by Addendum was left unanswered by Gridling, citing the ongoing proceedings. During his witness interview in February, the BVT director "for reasons of national security" even refused to disclose which "partner service" provided the information and what sources that service relied on. Perhaps the BVT U-committee will shed light on whether – and if so, which – "friends" abroad are reading emails from Austrian intelligence officers. Meanwhile, one may have to look for one or two new safe houses.

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ADDENDUM Article Series BVT: 

The Introduction on SPARTANAT: BVT in Austria: How Broken Was the Intelligence Service? 

Part 1: The BVT - a Design Flaw?

Part 2: Austrian Agent with an Agenda

Part 3: The "Chief Spy" Who Came from the Party

Part 4: Agent Gridling - the Other BVT Affair

More to come …

This article was originally published on ADDENDUM. Copyright Text: ADDENDUM. Images: Lilly Panholzer/Addendum

ADDENDUM Online: www.addendum.org