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Almost eighty years separate us from the last battles of the Second World War, which formed the basis for the strategic vision of the wars of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.
Despite the rapid development of weapons and equipment, especially aviation, rocket and space technology, communication and electronic warfare, the strategy of victory has always been to destroy the enemy and conquer or liberate territory. The forms and methods used to achieve this depend directly on the level of development and the number of weapons deployed. It goes without saying that knowledge of the basics of strategy, operational art, and tactics should accompany the professional career of the military specialist and serve to solve two main tasks.
The first one is probably secondary. It consists of preparing the commander directly for the impending war and assigning him the task of predicting the war situation at the beginning of hostilities. This is an extremely difficult task when it comes to finding a solution that allows defeating the enemy with dignity, bleeding out his forces, and gaining time to seize the initiative. The whole process is fraught with immense risks and doubts, as there is only one chance for small forces with limited resources to put up a proper resistance.
The second task, in my opinion, is the most important – to recognize in time the requirements that the war poses in connection with the development of technological progress and as a result, the rapid development of weapons and equipment, the political situation both in the world and in one's own country, the economic situation etc. And therefore, it is necessary to find for each war its own unique strategy and logic that allows finding the way to victory under new conditions. If we talk about our own strategy, we cannot completely discard the existing doctrines that describe the process of preparing and conducting operations. We only need to recognize that they are constantly changing and being filled with new content. The principles of operational art remain unchanged.
Given today's requirements, our main task will be to rethink the forms and methods of using forces in order to achieve victory.
The main reason for the change in strategy, forms, and methods of using armed forces is of course the development of weapons and equipment, especially unmanned systems, whose use is now widespread and enables a wide range of tasks that are constantly expanding. Thus, unmanned systems, along with other advanced types of weapons, are almost the only means to withdraw from military operations in the form of positions that are not temporally advantageous for Ukraine due to various reasons.
At the same time, there are several factors in the current situation that undoubtedly influence the decision to seek new forms of defense forces deployment. Here are some of them:
- the unstable political situation around Ukraine that leads to a decrease in military support;
- the high probability that Russia will provoke a series of conflicts similar to those in Israel and Yemen, causing important partners to withdraw their support for Ukraine;
- the depletion of our partners' supplies of missiles and ammunition for artillery and air defense due to the high intensity of hostilities in Ukraine and the impossibility of rapidly producing them given the global shortage of propellants;
- the inadequate effectiveness of the sanction policy, which leads to the development of capacities of the military-industrial complex in Russia and its partner states that at least allow the successful conduct of positional warfare;
- a significant advantage in mobilizing the opponent's human resources and the inability of the state institutions in Ukraine to increase the personnel of the armed forces without unpopular measures;
- the imperfection of the regulation framework for the military-industrial complex in our country and the partial monopolization of this industry leading to difficulties in manufacturing domestic ammunition, which in turn strengthens Ukraine's dependence on supplies from allies;
- the uncertainty about the further course of armed conflict in this scale as a result of the complexity for our allies in setting priorities for support;
The combat experience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, especially in the years 2022-2023, is unique and remains only our heritage, and therefore – always in search of the way to victory – it obliges us to constantly review the existing capabilities, on which the outcome of hostilities depends, and to seek ways to gain an advantage over the enemy. Furthermore, we understand the result of hostilities as those conditions under which the enemy will avoid further aggression. And creating such conditions is considered to be the effective use of the capabilities available in the arsenal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Given this and in accordance with today's conditions of warfare, the main option to gain an advantage might be in mastering the entire arsenal of relatively inexpensive, modern, and highly effective means that are rapidly evolving. Attempting to harness the progress in developing new technologies will allow winning the scientific, technical, technological, and tactical battle and will not only lead to an unconditional victory but also to saving and preserving the resources of both Ukraine and our partners.
The necessity to significantly increase the capabilities of unmanned systems and other advanced technological systems to positively influence the course of combat operations, therefore, promotes the search for new forms and methods of deployment, which in turn will surely affect the structure of both the armed forces and other components of the defense forces of Ukraine.
The influence of UAS and other modern systems on the effectiveness of combat operations can be increased by
– continuous improvement of commanders' situational awareness and the ability to maintain it in real-time in the operational area day and night and in all weather conditions;
– maintenance of fire and attack in real-time around the clock; provision of information for attack in real-time;
– precise and highly accurate strikes against the enemy and its targets both at the front and in the depth of the combat area.
This necessitates the development of a new operational concept based on existing technological capabilities, which is not only based on the spatial and temporal indicators of military (combat) operations, but above all on creating decisive conditions and achieving suitable effects that contribute to achieving the operational goal.
Based on the experiences of combat operations and forecasts concerning the development of armed combat, the crucial conditions are as follows:
– achieving absolute superiority in the air, especially at altitudes that allow effective fire support, ISR, and logistics;
– depriving the enemy of the ability to conduct offensive or defensive operations;
– increasing the mobility of own troops and complete restriction of enemy troops' mobility;
– secure access to specific lines, taking over important parts of the terrain; preventing the enemy from re-capturing lost positions and supporting own efforts.
At first glance, these are entirely conservative and classic demands, for their achievement, proven forms and methods are used. But only at first glance, because the means to achieve them have already changed, and the old truths are becoming more of a dream for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as the means to achieve them are changing primarily.
According to the presented idea of creating definitive conditions, the process of their implementation is, of course, ensured by solving a series of operational tasks, and the necessary effects are created in the solution of each operational task thanks to the means employed. And it is these means, deviating from the template and in accordance at least with the current doctrine, that should act due to technological superiority.
The creation of the necessary effect undoubtedly leads to radical changes in the work system today. Therefore, to create the conditions necessary for the necessary effect, it is necessary to consider the following aspects separately:
– digital field work
– radio-electronic situation presentation
– combined attack operations of unmanned aerial vehicles and cyber-assets; – logistical operations.
All the mentioned operations are already mastered and developed. They are carried out according to a unified concept and plan, coordinated and interconnected, but differ in content.
As for the direct operations to achieve the effect, they will essentially be both defensive and offensive in nature, but in terms of execution, they could be determined as follows:
– operation to reduce the enemy's economic capacities; – operation for complete isolation and attrition;
– robot-assisted reconnaissance and attack operations; – robot-assisted operations to control a crisis area; – psychological operations with offensive means;
– defensive technological operations without contact.
This list of forms of operations will constantly grow by itself with the development of the means, which, of course, will lead to changes in the doctrine and the formation of a completely new philosophy of preparation for and conduct of hostilities. The emergence of new independent forms of operations or their combination will then necessitate a new organizational plan. All of this is possible if state institutions react flexibly and quickly to changes.
This also changes the nature and content of classic defensive, offensive, and stabilization operations, the planning and execution of which have traditionally been linear and schematic. At the same time, these operations, also according to our partners' ideas, are essentially combined. Accordingly, the concept of network-centric warfare under the new conditions arising from the high-tech means of armed combat does not find its interpretation in the operations of the troops, but in creating effects and achieving decisive conditions with the help of appropriate capabilities.
I would like to emphasize that unmanned and other advanced technological systems not only increase the effectiveness of combat operations but also can solve a number of key issues in organizing and conducting combat operations of the defense forces of Ukraine:
– increased degree of contactless conduct of combat operations and thus reduced losses by the possibility of remote-controlled means; – decreased share of traditional weapons involvement in combat operations.
– ensuring the conduct of hostilities with limited use of heavy military equipment;
– despite the lack of naval vessels, effectively combat enemy overwater and underwater forces and their coastal infrastructure at sea in almost the entire depth of the theater of war with high efficiency and minimal risk to own personnel;
– conducting massive and sudden strikes against critical infrastructures and important communication facilities without having to resort to expensive battlefield missiles and manned aircraft.
This list of advantages is incomplete and will undoubtedly change, so the spectrum of effective deployment possibilities will expand overall. Naturally, the enemy on the battlefield will seek ways to protect itself and seize the initiative. With the development of attack system capabilities, including unmanned systems, it is therefore extremely important to improve protection and countermeasures. To master new forms and methods, the defense forces must create a completely new state system of technological upgrading, which includes the following subsystems:
– development and scientific support, production and maintenance;
– personnel training and generalization of combat experience; – troop deployment (Armed Forces)
– flexible funding; logistics.
It is very likely that each of these subsystems will require separate research and development work in the future, but even now it can be said that the system should be holistic and flexible at the same time, both in terms of the entities involved and in terms of funding and production changes.
Undoubtedly, all of this will take time, but time is crucial.
Considering the existing deployment system, all technical solutions found, the established leadership and guidance system, gained experiences, and partner assessments under modern conditions, the construction of such a system with the required production volume may take up to five months. This timeframe arises from the need to fill suitable organizational structures and equipment, train personnel, support resources, create necessary infrastructure, improve logistics, and develop a doctrinal framework.
Against this background, we must focus our main efforts until 2024 on the following points:
- Creating a system that equips the armed forces with high-tech means; - – Introducing a new philosophy for preparing and carrying out combat operations, taking into account possible restrictions; - in the end result, that we master these new capabilities for conducting war in the shortest possible time.
Therefore, the armed forces of Ukraine need to have capabilities under modern conditions, together with other components of the state defense forces, which not only enable the destruction of the enemy, but also ensure the survival of the state itself. That is why it is extremely important to seize all the opportunities that the new conditions of warfare offer in order to maximize the accumulation of the latest combat capabilities, allowing to inflict maximum damage on the enemy with fewer resources, stop its aggression, and protect Ukraine from it in the future.
Valeriy Salushnyi, Commander-in-Chief
SPARTANAT is the online magazine for Military News, Tactical Life, Gear & Reviews.
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