Colonel Markus Reisner: One year of war over Ukraine

02/25/2023 By Redaktion

Interview Conflicts War Colonel Markus Reisner

A year ago, on February 24, 2022, the war in Ukraine began. Colonel Markus Reisner explains what has happened so far, outlines the key dynamics, and provides an outlook on how the conflict could continue.

1: How long will the war last?

After the successful Ukrainian maneuver warfare (offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson) in the fall of last year, the Russian side was able to consolidate along a shortened frontline in the winter and impose a war of attrition and trench warfare on Ukraine once again (analogous to the summer of 2022). This trench warfare will be determined in the coming months primarily by the available resources on both sides (especially soldiers, weapons, ammunition).

If the Ukrainian side fails to go on the offensive and take territory, they will continue to be subjected to a steady attrition. This occurs on the battlefield through ongoing tactical Russian attacks along the entire frontline and in the depth of the country through strategic Russian airstrikes – the 14th wave of attacks took place on February 18 – targeting critical infrastructure.

The successes of Ukraine in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson in 2022 were spectacular local victories or probably the result of agreements, especially in Kherson. However, if Ukraine wants to win, they would need a decisive victory over Russian forces on Ukrainian territory. So far, the Ukrainian armed forces in Donbass have managed to stop the Russian troops in the second defense line north and south of Bakhmut, despite the breakthrough at Popasna in May 2022.

A lasting attrition effect, decreasing weapons and ammunition supplies, or the absence of a decisive, breakthrough success for Ukraine could lead to Ukraine being forced to agree to a ceasefire by mid/end of the year – analogous to the initial maneuver and subsequent trench warfare and resulting armistice agreement in Korea in July 1953. Ukraine and its Western allies are trying to prevent this development at all costs.

2: What is Ukraine's military situation?

Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine has been massively supported by the US through the transmission of "in-time" reconnaissance data, Starlink communication, and continuous extensive weapons deliveries from the US and NATO countries. This, along with their own carefully prepared defense tactics over the years, has been crucial in repelling Russian forces and even pushing them back regionally time and time again.

The crucial support for Ukraine primarily comes from the US. They provided a limited number of GPS-guided HIMARS rocket launchers with a range of 70 km and recently promised to send additional GLSDB missiles with up to 160 km range from Ramstein. However, this does not match Ukraine's request for ATACMS systems with a 300 km range.

The apparent strategy of the US is to walk a fine line, on one hand, supporting Ukraine as much as possible, but on the other hand, not cornering Russia. This is to prevent "irrational actions," such as a nuclear weapon deployment. A quick end to the war is thus not possible, and Ukraine faces the challenge of having to continuously form new units and recruit soldiers in the ongoing war.

Until now, Ukraine has been able to increase its forces from about 240,000 to around 500,000 soldiers – despite growing challenges in mobilization. However, there is a lack of heavy and long-range weapons, air defense, and artillery ammunition. Western deliveries are meant to address this issue. For this purpose, Ukraine is exerting constant pressure on the West to ensure that weapon deliveries do not cease or are even expanded (demands for battle tanks, armed drones, long-range surface-to-surface missiles, combat aircraft, and submarines).

So far, the Ukrainians have successfully held the front. The Russians have only achieved limited successes, and new major attacks by the Ukrainians (e.g., at Ugledar) have been successfully repelled, especially through the use of mines (especially remotely-laid RAAM/SCATMIN mines), anti-tank guided missiles, and artillery. However, in other areas like Bakhmut, there is a risk of encirclement and defeat of Ukrainian troops. The situation is dire. General Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine's military intelligence service, recently stated: "We are facing intense and decisive battles from the spring onwards. They could decide the war. It's 1:1, and we are in the 70th minute of the game."

3: How is Russia doing militarily?

By successfully withdrawing from Kherson without major losses and by constantly bringing in reserves (as a result of ongoing mobilizations), Russian forces have managed to establish a stable frontline. Holding this line is aided by the Dnieper River in the southeast and improved sustainably in the northeast through ongoing reinforcement measures (building tank ditches, laying minefields, erecting barriers, etc.).

So far, Russia has managed to prevent a third Ukrainian offensive towards Melitopol by launching massive attacks with Russian "Wagner" mercenaries and paratroopers in the Bakhmut area. Due to the strong Russian pressure on the second defense line here, Ukraine is repeatedly forced to bring in fresh reserves. Forces, however, that would be needed to prepare for a new offensive.

The Western sanctions on Russia have not yet shown the desired short-term effect. The Russian arms industry has managed to steadily increase domestic production and expand the output of tanks, precision-guided artillery ammunition, and drones quantitatively. In addition, repairs of existing equipment from former Soviet stocks and covert deliveries from abroad (Iran, China) have bolstered Russian capabilities. The influx of these arms and reservists is clearly visible at the frontline. Currently, it is estimated that Russia has about 400,000 soldiers deployed – double the number from February 2022.

Russia is attempting to wear down Ukrainian forces with these soldiers. It can, but does not necessarily need to, launch a large-scale new offensive. However, there are clear indicators that Russia has begun to exert pressure and go on the offensive at several sections along the front since early February. This primarily involves massive artillery attacks and advances by company and battalion combat groups.

In addition, Russia is actively trying to enhance the existing uncertainty and anti-war sentiment in the West or motivate its own population to persevere. Putin's speech on February 21 contained corresponding narratives. The Russian population was told that Russia was forced to fight for its survival, while the West was indirectly threatened again with the use of nuclear weapons.

4: Is a path to peace conceivable?

The fatal aspect of a war of attrition is that it can drag on for a long time. It is often not decided on the front lines, but in the hinterland or through the extent of support from third parties. Only when one side is completely worn out and demoralized can the other side manage to launch the decisive offensive. There are many examples of this in military history. Often, these historical examples also have in common the attempt to explore through negotiations in the background what a possible ceasefire or peace agreement could look like.

As long as both sides have the maximal demand of the other's surrender as their strategic end goal, diplomacy serves only as a mutual "testing", while the respective armed forces try to achieve a decision on the battlefield through the continuous deployment of reserves. This continues until the desired goal is reached, no reserves are left, or the population is no longer willing to endure the misery and losses of the war. The losses of the war are already high, but the threshold of tolerance has not yet been reached on both sides.

Ukraine wants to regain control of its entire territory, and Russia is not willing to accept its own defeat or even capitulation. Russian propaganda utilizes historical narratives ("Great Patriotic War 2.0"), simplistic explanatory models ("Everyone against Russia"), and appeals to its own nationalism ("Russia's fight for survival"). Ukraine, on the other hand, mainly seeks to maintain Western support and highlights the consequences of a possible failure ("Ukraine's fight serves the defense of Europe and the halt of Russian expansion!").

5: How should the West act now?

For the Western countries gathering in solidarity to support Ukraine and wanting to end the war quickly, there are only two options. Both approaches are presented at their core by two fundamentally different argumentative factions and their respective supporters. This factionalism is recognizable in the countries of Europe, their political leadership, and also in the public opinion. It is also strongly influenced by concerns about the massive consequences of an economic war or a possible resource shortage.

The first option is to provide massive additional support to Ukraine. With all the resources necessary to win a war of attrition of this nature and far beyond what has been done so far. This includes, above all, the delivery of land and air warfare means such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, combat aircraft, armed drones, and long-range surface-to-surface missiles. The aim is to push Russia back from the territories it occupies in Ukraine.

If the West deems this massive support for Ukraine too risky, lacks unity in action, or may not be able to do so due to a lack of resources, there is the consideration of a second option: to allow Russia a face-saving exit from the current course of the war. Even against the will of Ukraine. This approach could mean freezing the conflict along the current front lines and assumes that Russia is willing to do so or that Ukraine allows it. This would equate to a defeat for the West.

Which of the two options will ultimately be applied will depend on the willingness of the West (especially the USA) and its populations to continue supporting Ukraine. The biggest threat is that a clear victory for Russia could encourage itself – and also China – to take further escalatory steps in the coming years. A victory for Russia would also lead to great pressure within Europe. The Eastern states, which feel threatened by Russia, will vehemently demand massive support (especially through the delivery of arms and the establishment of bases) from Western and Central European countries.

More Markus Reisner on SPARTANAT:

"The Tactical Drone" by Christian Väth and Markus Reisner, SPARTANAT Black Book 2, pocket-sized paperback, 136 pages, Euro 14.90 – ORDER HERE exclusively in the SPARTANAT Shop