Chechens in Jihad

The Chechen jihadists have acquired an almost legendary status as fighters in the last decade. "Chechen" became synonymous with "militarily competent jihadist." Every time coalition forces encountered jihadists on the battlefield who mastered fire and movement, they were seen as "Chechens." In 2005, in Iraq, all effective insurgents' snipers were referred to as Chechens.

Despite this mythologization (until a real sniper was caught, there were only rumors that it must be a Chechen), it does not need to be discussed that the Chechen jihad has shaped the "Holy War" as a whole, particularly that of the Sunni Salafists. The most visible expression of this is currently, for example, Abu Omar al Schischani (image below), one of the field commanders of the Islamic State.

Born in Tarchan Batirashvili, al Schischani rose to prominence during the course of the Syrian civil war because he appeared in some IS videos documenting the fight against the Assad regime as well as against other rival rebel groups. According to reports, he has been killed at least three times in the past year, yet he continues to survive and reappear, most recently in the Iraqi province of Anbar. Rudaw reported that he is set to lead the assault on Kobane.

Al Schischani did not experience his first battle in Syria. Born in the Pankisi Valley, he joined the Georgian army and served during the 2008 Russian-Georgian war in a reconnaissance unit. His former commander describes him as very reliable in the field, and he was promoted to sergeant before leaving the army in 2010 for health reasons (he had tuberculosis).

Al Schischani (which, by the way, means nothing other than "The Chechen") himself did not engage against the Russians in Chechnya. But he is just the latest in a line of Chechen fighters dating back to the Russian-Chechen war of 1994. The original war lasted only from 1994 until the Russian withdrawal in 1996, but by then, the Islamists were already deeply rooted in the population. The guerrilla war until 1999 produced even more veterans.

While the majority of the Chechen population was always Muslim, historically Sufi, followers of an Islamic sect. This sect was repeatedly persecuted by other Muslims because Sufism keeps the political and religious spheres separate. The Chechen population before 1994 was not particularly receptive to the jihadist teachings presented by Sunni Salafists. The separatist movement, led by Dzhokhar Dudayev, was purely nationalist; it had no religious element involved. It was only when the Arab Al-Qaeda fighter Ibn al-Khattab (image below) and his supporters emerged that the Chechen war turned into a religious one.

What happened then in Chechnya was the co-option of a nationalist movement by a transnational ideological movement. The fact that Chechens were Muslims was a secondary matter to Chechen nationalists themselves, but it was the gateway through which Al-Qaeda gained access. However, the Chechens found the foreign mujahideen on the ground to be of little help - very few of them spoke Russian at all. This is very similar to the Taliban's ambivalent attitude towards the Arab Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda fighters could also benefit from the fact that the Russians first subjugated the Chechens, also because they were extremely poor and had little access to weapons and equipment.

While the Chechens themselves remained Sufi, the presence of Al-Qaeda since the 1990s has led many Chechen fighters to embrace Sunni Salafism as their faith. Many of them have military experience, either from Georgia - like Abu Omar al Schischani - or from fighting against the Russians in Chechnya. It seems that Chechen fighters have developed a military culture more reminiscent of Russians than Arabs. Hence the reputation that they show higher effectiveness on the battlefield. Many of the unconfirmed reports in the style of "There's someone really ugly out there, it could be a Chechen" may be romanticized, but the fact remains that there are fighters and commanders from Chechnya fighting effectively and internationally in the name of jihad.

No one claims that the current success of the Islamic State is solely based on the presence of someone like Abu Omar al Schischani. A commander cannot be responsible for the whole well-planned and executed movement and guerrilla warfare campaign that the Islamic State has implemented in Syria and Iraq. The underlying factors behind the military success of the Islamic State must be established. One thing is sure, the Chechen factor plays a role.

Chechens in Syria: www.chechensinsyria.com

PETER NEALEN is a former Reconnaissance Marine and Iraq and Afghanistan veteran. The article first appeared on the US Special Operations Network SOFREP.com.

Reprinted with kind permission from SOFREP.com