G36 - That's what Heckler & Koch says

A company is upset. An important product is not getting out of the headlines as the customer has a lot of "secret reports" that are being leaked to the media. There are rumors and opinions instead of facts and truths. HERE is the SPARTANAT article on the current events surrounding the HK G36. After a long silence, Heckler & Koch itself has now responded to the alleged accusations against the G36, that it heats up and does not shoot accurately. Here we document the current statement of the Oberndorf-based weapon manufacturer, which dispels speculations and insinuations:

Heckler & Koch demands an independent investigation of irregularities in Bundeswehr examinations

Heckler & Koch calls for an independent forensic investigation of all G36 trials conducted by the Bundeswehr by the Federal Criminal Police Office

Weapons and ammunition technical principles ignored in Bundeswehr examinations

Heckler & Koch presents options for improving the combat capabilities of the G36

Heckler & Koch welcomes the declared willingness of the Ministry of Defense to follow up the serious allegations made against the company with far-reaching consequences for our technical reputation with a substantial investigation. Nebulous allegations not only damage the reputation of our company but above all unsettle our soldiers in deployment and undermine the credibility of our forces to Germany's allies.

We also regret that our company has not been contacted or informed by any authority within the Bundeswehr about the incidents to date, even though we have offered open and constructive dialogue at all times. It has not been specified under which conditions and with what requirements the G36 tests are supposed to have been conducted. We have no evidence that soldiers have been put in danger due to the poor shooting accuracy of the G36. It remains unchanged that increased heating of the G36 does not lead to malfunctions or the failure of the weapon. The material composition of the HK50 rifle tested by the Bundeswehr, introduced in 1995 under the designation G36, was always known to the federal government. The alleged deficiencies now being discussed, which are attributed to the relatively few combat operations of the Bundeswehr, would have had to appear and become known much earlier in other troops deployed in various locations – however, this is not the case.

The analysis Heckler & Koch has made from the information found in the media shows, among other things, that the current discussion contributes little to clarifying the situation. From Heckler & Koch's perspective, the recent establishment of an internal commission by the Ministry of Defense gives cause for concern that an independent and credible examination and clarification of all the events that have been the subject of discussion within the Bundeswehr around the G36 for the past five years will be difficult. Members of the commission are not independent due to their proximity to the Bundeswehr and have already made negative statements about the G36 in public. In view of the recent public statements by the Ministry of Defense about the G36 rifle and the as yet unclear mandate of the announced investigation, the conditions for a transparent and fact-based work of the internal commission now established appear to be insufficient.

Heckler & Koch therefore demands an independent examination and clarification of all processes regarding the G36 issue by the Ministry of Defense, as well as a forensic examination of all allegations and alleged expert opinions by the Federal Criminal Police Office.

Given our corporate responsibility as an employer of more than 700 employees, we now feel compelled to examine possible official liability claims against the federal government for the damage to our reputation and credit that has occurred and continues to occur at Heckler & Koch in recent years. In our view, these results since 2011 are based on the faulty and one-sided test procedures carried out by the Bundeswehr for the G36 and the negative "secret reports" repeatedly leaked to the press.

Heckler & Koch sees indications here for liability on the part of the federal government, as these circumstances are apparently due to inadequate or missing supervision by subordinate Bundeswehr authorities, in particular the Weapons and Ammunition Technical Center 91 (WTD 91) and the Institute for Weapon and Ammunition Technology (WIWeB). Among other things, the administrative principles relating to the so-called "bad appearance" were not complied with. Furthermore, the repeated publication of confidential or classified documents with partly obviously preliminary results of unfinished tests has revealed serious gaps in the federal government's data security.

Furthermore, the judicial enforcement of the release of all trial documents of the Bundeswehr for the G36 to Heckler & Koch is currently a subject of examination due to contractual ancillary obligations.

Regarding the recent test report of the Bundeswehr that has become public, Heckler & Koch states:

From various media reports, including statements made during the government press conference on 01.04.2015, it can be inferred that in the recent comparison tests, not several, but only one weapon is said to have performed better than the G36.

It was stated in the government press conference on 01.04.2015 that the weapons that outperformed the G36 were also from Heckler & Koch.(3) However, since Heckler & Koch only offers one more modern rifle platform in 5.56mm NATO caliber and comparing the G36 with rifles in other calibers is physiologically impossible, it is not clear how the G36 could have performed worse than several other HK products. In fact, due to the 5.56mm NATO caliber, only the HK rifle platform HK416 in the assault rifle version is comparable to the G36. Thus, in the recent tests according to the "new" lab scenarios unknown in detail by Heckler & Koch, only one other HK weapon, the HK416, could have outperformed the G36.

From our point of view, the following additional findings and considerations arise:

In the context of examinations by the Bundeswehr on comparative shootings at the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, Heckler & Koch had been asked for test rifles of the HK416 type. Due to Heckler & Koch's factual exclusion from the new investigations and due to the administrative so-called "bad appearance" regarding the conducting persons and institutions, Heckler & Koch was already compelled at the end of 2014 not to support these investigations and thus not to supply test rifles of the HK416 type.

These facts suggest that the Bundeswehr did not have HK416 test rifles of the latest model series (HK416A5 and HK416A6) available for their recent tests. It is also assumed that for these tests, old models of the HK416 type from the WTD91 inventory were used, which Heckler & Koch had delivered in 2011 as part of the Bundeswehr tender "G26" under the designation "HK416Bw."

The rifle "HK416Bw" is a special weapon in the form of a light machine gun, not – as with the G36 – a standard assault rifle designed to special requirements. Therefore, the firearm in particular was equipped with a barrel whose external dimensions are almost identical to those of the Bundeswehr machine gun MG4, as the comparison graphics below illustrate.

In view of these facts, there is no other conclusion than that comparing the G36 with the light machine gun HK416Bw is technically inadmissible. Therefore, the recent Bundeswehr tests indicate that the G36 must be the weapon that performed best in the new laboratory scenarios as the standard assault rifle.

Therefore, no technically justifiable deficiencies of the G36 as a standard assault rifle in the context of the so-called "weapon mix" of the infantry group in the Bundeswehr can be identified. However, the public is currently being led to believe that there are several rifles on the market which are allegedly superior to the G36 in certain tactical or climatic scenarios – in fact, there is only one model, and this is not an assault rifle; but a light machine gun with magazine feed and – apart from the outward appearance – in no way comparable to a standard assault rifle.

In this context, the fact that no improvement of the G36 has been mentioned by the Bundeswehr is particularly noticeable. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defense publicly claims that the latest investigations have revealed a tactical gap that now needs to be closed. The information currently available to the public suggests that simply replacing the current G36 barrel with one of larger outer diameters or greater mass would eliminate the alleged accuracy reductions in the new laboratory scenarios.

The theory that the material or material combination of the G36 housing is the cause of all problems does not hold up as an argument against improving the combat capabilities of the G36 A1/A2 through barrel replacement on several grounds. This dubious theory about the material of the G36 housing is actually only advocated by three employees of the WTD91 and the WIWeB.

These are the same employees who claimed from the end of 2011 to the end of 2013 that the alleged poor material execution of the G36 was the reason for an expansion of shot group patterns in the overheated state, until it was proven by independent bodies by the end of 2013 that the faulty ammunition of a manufacturer was the cause.

These employees were never held accountable for these incorrect expert opinions. Instead, the Federal Office for Equipment, Information Technology, and Use of the Bundeswehr (BAAINBw) informed Heckler & Koch at the end of 2014 that these employees would be assigned similar experiments as part of the now media-discussed investigations with the full knowledge of the Ministry of Defense and in disregard of the administrative "bad appearance."

Heckler & Koch assumes that due to compelling procurement regulations, which stipulate that any tactical gap must be closed with the least costly technical solution, an improvement of the G36's combat capabilities must always take precedence over the procurement of a new rifle system. In case of failure to carry out this technical or procurement-related review, Heckler & Koch considers the responsible officials and soldiers of the Bundeswehr guilty of criminal breach of trust to the detriment of the federal government. Upon learning of such misconduct, Heckler & Koch would immediately report it to the relevant law enforcement authorities.

In the current debate, the fact that the majority of the approximately 170,000 remaining G36 rifles in the Bundeswehr are at a technical level that is about 12-20 years old and therefore far behind the tactical options achievable with today's technology is hardly mentioned.

It is particularly regrettable that since at least 2007, the Bundeswehr has failed multiple times to define a configuration for enhancing the combat capabilities of the standard G36 rifles, most recently under the project name "G36 Basic Long Rifle" in the Bundeswehr. It is particularly noteworthy why the Bundeswehr has not formulated any technical specifications for Heckler & Koch regarding these allegedly new requirements, which are presented as "deficiencies" of the G36, in the context of this ongoing combat enhancement project in the past five years.

If, after the conclusive investigation results are made public, there should indeed be confirmed a "tactical gap" due to changed deployment scenarios since the introduction of the G36, Heckler & Koch offers an adjustment at any time in the form of "combat enhancement." These adjustments could also be implemented accordingly for the G36 short versions (G36k).

Heckler & Koch also offers a new version of the HK416 rifle platform, the HK416A6, specifically designed for user groups who prefer a light machine gun with magazine feeding over one with belt feeding, if the operational priority is on interchangeability of magazines between standard assault rifle shooters and light machine gun shooters.

Heckler & Koch will only provide the two combat-enhanced versions of the G36 and the HK416A6 to independent testing institutes commissioned by the Bundeswehr, which will evaluate them based on the "new" tactical requirements to be defined in a legally binding and final manner by the federal government. Otherwise, there is a risk of further changing the test parameters during ongoing tests to the detriment of HK products.

Furthermore, the current debate suggests that the accuracy primarily or exclusively depends on the weapon configuration. Ammunition is portrayed as an insignificant or negligible factor. However, this representation does not align with the technical and tactical reality.

The same applies to discussions about accuracy in the Bundeswehr. While the US military introduced precision ammunition in the 7.62mm NATO caliber during the mid-1960s during the Vietnam conflict and then fully implemented this in the 5.56mm NATO caliber (the caliber of the G36) shortly after the start of the Afghanistan War in 2002, the Bundeswehr has made no efforts or projectings to realize a military precision cartridge in the 5.56mm NATO caliber to this day. This lack of understanding is even more surprising considering that since 2003, increased accuracy has been demanded by several groups in various contexts within the framework of rifle projects, including the Special Forces Command (KSK), for which the necessary weapon conditions were always available but implementation always failed due to ammunition issues. Notable examples include the KSK "G36-Sniper" project and the "Precision Rifle G28." It is therefore as remarkable as it is regrettable that the Bundeswehr apparently always desires above-average accuracy but seems to lack a learning curve regarding the issue of "precision ammunition;" similar phenomena can also be observed with optics on standard assault rifles in the context of these far above-average accuracy demands.

Viewing the G36 debate in the overall context of the current equipment status of the Bundeswehr, it can be observed that with a peace-time strength of around 180,000 soldiers and a mobilization strength of around 250,000 soldiers, the Bundeswehr has only about 170,000 G36 assault rifles in its inventory.

For comparison: during the Cold War until 1990, the Bundeswehr had a mobilization strength of around 500,000 soldiers and an inventory of 2 million assault rifles.

Thus, during the Cold War, there were three spare rifles available for each