BOOKS & MORE: Not to win

It could have been a very different story. The British and US forces could have successfully withdrawn from Afghanistan in 2002 after fulfilling their mission: defeating al-Qaeda and preventing them from carrying out further terrorist attacks against the West. Instead, British troops became part of a larger international effort "to stabilize the country". However, over the following thirteen years, the British military paid a high price for its presence in Helmand province; and when the first Western troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 2014, they had not succeeded in preventing a resurgence of the Taliban.

In this masterful study, Theo Farrell explains the origins and causes of the war and provides fascinating insights into the British government's response to 9/11 and the steps that led the British army to Helmand. He details the individual campaigns and operations in the following years and shows how the military's efforts to develop a successful strategy were repeatedly undermined by the political realities in Kabul and at home. And he convincingly demonstrates that the West's failure to understand the dynamics of local conflicts in the country and to combat the corruption of the Afghan government led to the unwinnability of the war.

With unprecedented access to military reports and government documents, as well as hundreds of interviews with Western commanders, senior Taliban representatives, Afghan civilians, and British politicians, "Unwinnable" is an extraordinary scholarly work. The depth of analysis, scope, and authority make it the definitive history of the British war in Afghanistan. And an analysis that shows how great the failure was in 2021, as all Western troops left Afghanistan without fanfare and left it to fend for itself.

“Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan, 2001–2014” by Theo Farrell, Penguin Books, London 2017, 555 pages.